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11.1  Introduction 
Perceived shortcomings in the quality of American education at the 
elementary and secondary school levels have drawn much public at- 
tention recently.  In particular, concern with the composition  of  the 
teacher force has been prominent. This focus presumably arises out of 
the juxtaposition of three factors. 
First, there is general acceptance of the proposition that educational 
achievement is influenced by the ability of the teachers who guide the 
learning process. (There is, of course, much less agreement about how 
educational achievement and teacher ability should be measured.) Sec- 
ond, there is an often-expressed dissatisfaction with the distribution of 
ability within the present teaching force. Third, there is a common 
perception that feasible changes in public policy can generate a shift 
in the ability distribution of the supply of teachers. In particular, it is 
asserted that merit pay, general increases in teacher salaries, and/or 
subsidization of  the college education of prospective teachers would 
induce more college students of  high ability to select teaching as a 
career. 
Informed assessment of  the various proposals for increasing the at- 
tractiveness of teaching is possible only if  we can forecast the extent 
to which these proposals, if enacted, would influence the occupational 
choice decisions of high-ability young adults. Until now, there has been 
no basis for making such forecasts. In the absence of empirical analysis, 
we can only guess at the impact of changes in teacher salaries on the 
quality composition of the teaching force. 
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The research reported here, through analysis of data from a national 
sample of  college graduates, examines the relationship between aca- 
demic ability, earnings, and the decision  to become a teacher. The 
National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS72) 
surveyed  22,652  high  school  seniors in  the spring of  1972 and has 
subsequently followed this panel as its members have progressed through 
postsecondary  education and into the labor force.  The most  recent 
survey took place in October 1979. At that time, contact was success- 
fully made with 18,630 members of the panel. Of these, 3,502 reported 
they had completed a bachelor’s degree in 1976 or  1977. Of this group, 
2,952 reported they were working in October 1979. Of  these, 510 re- 
ported they were employed as teachers. 
The NLS72 data offer a valuable  resource  for description of  the 
empirical pattern of ability, earnings, and occupations found in a recent 
cohort of American college graduates. Inspection of these data reveals 
the following: 
-Among  the working NLS72 respondents who have received a bach- 
elor’s degree, the frequency of choice of teaching as an occupation is 
inversely  related to academic ability. This holds  whether  academic 
ability is measured by SAT score or by high school class rank. Con- 
ditioning on SAT score, however, the frequency of choice of teaching 
does not vary with class rank. 
-Conditioning  on sex and academic ability, the earnings of teachers 
are  much  lower,  on  average,  than  those  of  other  working  college 
graduates. 
-Conditioning  on  sex, the earnings of  teachers tend to rise only 
slightly, if at all, with academic ability. A relationship between earnings 
and ability is more noticeable in other occupations but remains weak. 
Academic ability explains only a small part of the observed variation 
in earnings within the cohort of NLS72 college graduates. 
-Conditioning  on academic ability and occupation, males consis- 
tently have higher earnings than  do females. The sex differential in 
earnings is relatively small in teaching but quite pronounced in other 
occupations. Interestingly, the rate at which earnings rise with ability 
is very similar for males and females. 
To evaluate policy proposals intended to influence the composition 
of the teaching force, it is necessary to go beyond descriptive analysis. 
The NLS72 data support estimation of an econometric model explaining 
occupation choice as a function of the earnings and nonmonetary char- 
acteristics associated with alternative occupations. Given this model, 
it is possible  to forecast the consequences  of policies that  combine 
increases in teacher salaries with the institution of minimum academic 
ability standards for teacher certification. Forecasts presented in this 
paper suggest the following: 293  Teacher Ability and Earnings 
-In  the absence of a minimum ability standard, increases in teacher 
earnings would yield substantial growth in the size of the teaching force 
but minimal improvement in the average academic ability of teachers. 
Under present conditions, the aggregate wage elasticity of the supply 
of teachers appears to be in the range of two to three. As wages in- 
crease, both high- and low-ability students are attracted into teaching, 
so the ability composition of the teaching force changes little. 
-If  teacher salaries are not  increased,  institution of  a minimum 
ability standard improves the average ability of the teaching force but 
reduces its  size. Establishment  of  a standard sufficient to raise the 
average academic ability of teachers to the average of  all college grad- 
uates may reduce the size of the teaching force by 20 percent. 
-The  average ability of the teaching force can be improved and the size 
of the teaching force maintained if minimum ability standards are com- 
bined with sufficient salary increases. It appears that the average aca- 
demic ability of teachers can be raised to the average of all college gradu- 
ates ifa minimum SAT score (verbal  plus math) of 800 is required for teacher 
certification and if teacher salaries are raised by about 10 percent over their 
present levels. To achieve further improvements in average teacher abil- 
ity without reducing the size of the teaching force would require a higher 
minimum ability standard combined with a larger salary increase. 
Before proceeding, it is important to stress that the indicators of 
ability available for the NLS72 panel and used in this research are 
certain measures of academic success, namely SAT scores and high 
school class rank. It seems reasonable to assume that these variables 
are positively  associated with performance as a teacher, but formal 
evidence for this proposition is lacking. (See, for example, the discus- 
sion in Weaver 1983.) The relevance of the analysis that follows to the 
debate over the quality of the teacher force depends on the extent to 
which academic ability and teaching ability coincide. 
The plan of this chapter is as follows: Section  11.2 describes the 
NLS72 sample and the variables that measure occupation, academic 
ability, and earnings. Section 11.3 reports our descriptive analysis of 
the NLS72 data. The econometric model explaining occupation choices 
is developed and estimated in section 11.4. The model is applied to 
forecast the effects of policy proposals in  section 11.5. Section 11.6 
contains brief concluding comments. 
11.2  Composition of  the Sample and Definition of Variables 
11.2.1  The Sample 
The work in this chapter is based entirely on data for the 2,952 NLS72 
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had received a bachelor’s degree in  1976 or 1977 and that they were 
working in October 1979. Some of the analysis is based on the sub- 
sample of respondents for whom complete academic ability and earn- 
ings data were available. A comprehensive description of the NLS72 
data, including the sample design, questionnaires, and frequency counts 
of responses, is given in Riccobono et al. (1981). 
11.2.2  The Occupation Variable 
In all that follows, a respondent’s occupation is taken to be his or 
her declared job type in October 1979 as coded by the NLS into the 
three-digit census classification system. In the cross-tabulations of ta- 
bles ll.  1, ll  .2, and ll  .4, these codes are aggregated into three occu- 
pation classes: (a)  teachers, exclusive of college faculty (census codes 
141 -45); (6)  professional, technical, and kindred workers, exclusive of 
teachers (census codes 001 -  140,150-95); and (c) all other occupations 
(census codes 201-992).  In the models of tables 11.3, 11.5, and 11.6, 
classes (b) and (c) are further aggregated into a single “nonteaching” 
occupation. 
In principle,  the census coding system distinguishes  various cate- 
gories of  teachers. In practice, this detailed coding is ambiguous be- 
cause 275 of the 510 teachers are not classified. Of  the ones who are 
classified, 35 are reported to be nursery and kindergarten teachers, 104 
to be elementary school teachers, 92 to be secondary school teachers, 
and 4 to be adult education teachers. These are small samples, partic- 
ularly when disaggregated by sex. 
Coded as unclassified teachers are such groups as fine arts teachers 
and flying instructors as well as those school teachers whose response 
to the occupation question was insufficiently detailed to permit a more 
refined classification. Examination of the employer codes for the clas- 
sified and unclassified teachers reveals that 59 percent of the former 
group and 60 percent of the latter group work for governmental units. 
The ability and earnings distributions of the two groups are also similar. 
These facts make it reasonable to assume that the unclassified group 
is composed primarily of elementary and high school teachers. Given 
this and given the small size of the classified group, the statistics pre- 
sented here are computed using all respondents coded as teachers, not 
just those for whom a more detailed classification is available. 
It should be noted that the NLS72 survey offers some alternatives 
to our identification of occupation with job type in October 1979. First, 
whenever a respondent reported that he had worked in October 1978 
or October 1977, job type at these dates was reported. Second, when 
interviewed in 1979, each panel member was asked to anticipate his or 
her occupation at age thirty (that is, about five years into the future). 
Third, each respondent was asked to report the field in which he or 295  Teacher Ability and Earnings 
she received a bachelor’s degree. I have chosen to use the October 
1979 job reports because they are the latest revealed preference data 
available for the NLS72 respondents. It would be interesting to redo 
the analysis using alternative definitions of occupation. 
11.2.3  The Academic Ability Variables 
As part of  the base-year survey instrument administered  in  1972, 
the NLS obtained from guidance personnel the percentile high school 
class rank of each respondent and, where available, each respondent’s 
SAT or ACT score. A  battery of  IQ and aptitude tests was admin- 
istered as well.  In this  paper,  academic  ability is measured  by  the 
class rank  and  SAT/ACT data.  The NLS test battery  data are not 
used here. 
Among the 2,952 respondents,  class rank information is available 
for 2,287. Either an SAT or ACT score is available for 2,468 respon- 
dents, with the former predominating.  While the SAT and ACT ex- 
aminations are distinct, I have, in the interest of using observations 
efficiently, converted each ACT score to an SAT equivalent by match- 
ing the tenth and  ninetieth percentile  scores and interpolating else- 
where. The rationale for using both the class rank and SAT score as 
measures of  academic  ability is that  the two have  previously  been 
shown to have complementary explanatory power in predicting both 
college admissions decisions and college completion rates (Manski and 
Wise 1983). 
11.2.4  The Earnings Variable 
Each respondent working in October 1979 was asked to report gross 
pay per week at his or her primary job. Hours worked per week at the 
primary job were also reported. In the parts of this chapter concerned 
with earnings, I restrict attention to the 2,335 respondents whose re- 
ported hours worked per week are between thirty and sixty and whose 
pay per week is between $100 and $800. The restriction on hours worked 
is intended to limit attention to “normal” full-time  jobs. The restriction 
on pay cuts off volunteer workers on the low end and, on the high end, 
a few respondents whose reported weekly pay seemed extraordinary 
for a twenty-five-year-old in 1979. 
The reported pay per week is used as the measure of realized earn- 
ings. An obvious alternative measure is the hourly wage, computed by 
dividing gross pay by hours worked. The former measure seems pref- 
erable since most college graduates are paid on a salary rather than on 
an hourly basis. Empirically, the same patterns emerge whichever earn- 
ings measure is used. Note that all monetary figures in this paper are 
expressed in 1979 dollars. 296  Charles F.  Manski 
11.3  Patterns of Academic Ability, Occupation, and Earnings 
11.3.1  Academic Ability and Occupation 
Considering males and females separately, table 11.1 partitions the 
sample respondents into four SAT score groups and, for each group, 
presents the observed distribution of  occupations. In table 11.2, per- 
centile class rank in high school is used as the measure of ability. These 
Table 11.1  Occupation as a Function of Sex and SAT Score 
SAT Score (verbal + math) 
Occupation  400-800  801-1000  1001 -  1200  1201 -  1600 
A. Males 
Teacher  .I6  .ll  .06  .05 
Professional  .22  .23  .36  .55 
Other  .62  .66  .58  .40 
Number of  148  400  501  22 1 
respondents 
B. Females 
Teacher  .34  .30  .21  .09 
Professional  .I4  .26  .36  .46 
Other  .52  .43  .43  .45 
Number of  208  42 1  413  156 
respondents 
Table 11.2  Occupation as a Function of Sex and High School Class Rank 
~  ~~~~~~ 
Percentile Class Rank 
Occupation  1-50  51-75  76-90  91 -  100 
A. Males 
Teacher  .ll  .09  .08  .06 
Professional  .20  .24  .34  .53 
Other  .69  .66  .57  .40 




Teachers  .35  .3 I  .24  .20 
Professional  .14  .23  .29  .39 
Other  .51  .46  .47  .41 
Number of  116  244  336  407 
respondents 297  Teacher Ability and Earnings 
data clearly corroborate the conventional wisdom that choice of teach- 
ing as an occupation is inversely related to academic ability. It does 
not matter whether we look at males or females, whether we take SAT 
score or class rank as the measure of academic ability. In each case, 
the frequency with which the NLS72 respondents enter teaching falls 
substantially as academic ability rises. In contrast, the frequency with 
which respondents work in professional or technical fields other than 
teaching consistently rises with ability, in fact dramatically so. 
Other cross-tabulations of SAT scores and occupation based on NLS72 
data have been presented in Vance and Shlechty (1982). Their criteria 
for inclusion in the sample and for classification of a respondent as a 
teacher were different than those used here. Their findings were similar. 
Table  11.3 offers further perspective  on the relationship between 
academic ability and occupation. Considering males and females sep- 
arately, this table presents estimates for a simple probit model explain- 
ing the probability  that, conditioned on SAT score and class rank, a 
working college graduate is a teacher. Inspection of the results indicates 
that when  SAT score and class rank are conditioned on jointly, the 
partial effect of  SAT score on the probability  of entering teaching is 
almost identically negative and statistically  significant for males and 
females. On the other hand, the partial effect of class rank is very weak 
and ambiguous in sign. In fact, it is reasonable to conclude that holding 
SAT score fixed, the probability of  entering teaching does not vary 
with class rank. 
11.3.2  Academic Ability, Occupation, and Earnings 
Considering males and females separately, table 11.4 partitions the 
sample into twelve SAT score-occupation cells. Presented in each cell 
are (1) mean pay per week, (2) the number of respondents in the cell, 
and (3) the standard deviation of  pay per week. I have computed al- 
ternative tables using hourly wage as the measure of earnings and class 
Table 11.3  Probit Model of Teaching Occupation as a Function of  Sex and 
Academic Ability 
Males  Females 
Asymptotic  Asymptotic 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
~  ~~ 
SAT score  -  0.001 15  (0.00036)  -0.001 11  (0.00029) 
Class rank  0.00068  (0.00298)  -  0.00228  (0.00275) 
Intercept  -0.304  (0.317)  0.565  (0.240) 
Sample size  1037  968 
(200-1600) 
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rank as the measure of academic ability and have found patterns very 
similar to those in table 11.4. Among the many interesting features of 
table 11.4 are the following: 
-Conditioning on sex and SAT score, mean pay per week is almost 
always highest for professional and technical workers and lowest for 
teachers, with workers  in other occupations in between.  For males, 
the differentials are more substantial than for females. For example, 
considering males with SAT score in the 801-1,000  range, the mean 
pay of professional workers is 1.48 times that of teachers. For females, 
the comparable number is 1.22. 
-Conditioning  on sex, mean pay per week in  the nonteaching oc- 
cupations tends to rise with SAT score but the pattern is weak. For 
teachers, there is little evidence of  an earnings-ability pattern. A rela- 
Table 11.4  Pay per Week  as a Function of  Sex, SAT Score, and Occupation 
SAT Score (verbal + math) 
Occupation  400-800  801-1000  1001-1200  1201-1600  Total 
A.  Males 
Teacher mean  237 
Count  14 
Std. dev.  63 
Professional  3  20 
26 
91 
Other  27 1 
80 
101 




















































Teacher mean  199 
Count  51 
Std. dev.  54 
Professional  272 
24 
153 
Other  22 1 
86 
70 
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76 
24 1 
9  69 
78 
Note:  Mean pay is in dollars, reported in October 1979. 299  Teacher Ability and Earnings 
tionship becomes more apparent if we do not condition on occupation. 
Examination of the column marginals indicates clearly that mean pay 
does increase with SAT score. In particular, the mean pay of males with 
scores in the 1,200-1,600 range is 1.18 times that of those with scores 
in the 400-800  range. For females, the comparable number is 1.27. 
-Conditioning on SAT score and occupation, males  consistently 
have higher mean pay per week than females. This pattern persists in 
almost every SAT score-occupation cell but is least pronounced among 
teachers. To  cite some examples, the mean pay of professional males 
with SAT scores in the 1,000- 1,200 range is 1.21 times that of females 
with the same characteristics. Considering teachers with SAT scores 
in the same range, the mean income of  the males is 1.04 that of the 
females. Recall that these data concern a sample of respondents all of 
whom graduated from high school in 1972, all of whom graduated from 
college in  1976 or 1977, and all of whom are working at least thirty 
hours per week and earning at least $100 per week in 1979. It is therefore 
difficult to attribute the observed differences in the pay of males and 
females to an unobserved determinant correlated with sex. 
-Conditioning  on sex and SAT score, the standard deviation of pay 
per week is consistently much lower for teachers than for the remaining 
two occupation groups. Conditioning on sex and occupation, the stan- 
dard deviation is more or less invariant across ability groups. Condi- 
tioning on SAT score and occupation, the standard deviation is gen- 
erally lower for females than for males. 
Table  11.5 gives additional insight into the behavior  of  earnings. 
Conditioning on sex and occupation (teacher versus nonteacher), the 
table presents ordinary least squares estimates of a model explaining 
pay per week as a linear function of SAT score and high school class 
rank. Inspection of  the table indicates that academic ability explains 
only a small part of the variation in observed earnings across this cohort 
of working college graduates. This fact, which was earlier noted in the 
analysis of table 11.4, is expressed succinctly in the R2  statistics, which 
range from .03 to .06. 
At the same time, the regressions uniformly show that conditioning 
on sex and occupation, earnings do increase with both SAT score and 
class rank. In fact, the estimated coefficients are reasonably similar 
across the four subsamples. To get a feel for magnitudes, consider a 
one hundred point  increase in SAT score. The predicted effects on 
weekly earning across the four subsamples are $5.06, $7.26, $4.01, and 
$5.61 respectively. A ten percentile increase in class rank is associated 
with earnings increases of $2.85, $3.50, $4.19, and $3.69 respectively. 
The marginal statistical significance of the estimated coefficients should 
make one cautious in drawing sharp implications from these numbers. 
The general pattern, however, seems firmly based. 300  Charles F.  Manski 
Table 11.5  Linear Model of Earnings as a Function of Sex, Occupation, and 
Academic Ability 
Male Teachers  Male Nonteachers 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
SAT score  0.0506  (0.0475)  0.0726  (0.0234) 
Class rank  0.285  (0.421)  0.350  (0.189) 
(200-1600) 
(1-100) 
Intercept  158.  (41.)  204.  (21.) 
R2  .04  .03 
Sample size  64  748 
Female Teachers  Female Nonteachers 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
SAT score  0.0401  (0.0279)  0.0561  (0.02  19) 
(400-1600) 
(1-100) 
Class rank  0.419  (0.239)  0.369  (0.228) 
Intercept  147.  (22.)  162.  (20.) 
Sample size  188  593 
R2  .06  .03 
Note:  Earnings are in dollars per week, in 1979. 
Comparison of the coefficients for males and females suggests that 
the earnings of males may be somewhat more sensitive to SAT score 
than are those of females but less sensitive to class rank. Again, these 
differences are relatively small. It seems more relevant to stress that 
the earnings of males and females tend to increase similarly with ac- 
ademic ability. The differences between male and female earnings that 
were seen in table 11.4 show up in these regressions as differences in 
the intercept coefficients. Those for males are higher than those for 
females, with the discrepancy much more pronounced in occupations 
other than teaching. 
11.4  A Structural Interpretation of the Observed Patterns 
The patterns of academic ability, earnings, and occupation reported 
in section 11.2 arise out of the interaction of the decisions of two sets 
of actors, college graduates and employers. In selecting occupations, 
college graduates presumably compare the expected earnings streams 
and nonmonetary characteristics  associated with the available alter- 
natives. In making job offers, employers may use measured academic 
ability as an indicator of potential job performance. To  the extent that 301  Teacher Ability and Earnings 
academic ability is perceived by employers to be positively associated 
with job performance, college graduates with high ability will be offered 
more attractive positions than will be offered those with low ability. 
To the extent that the return to ability differs across occupations, we 
should observe an empirical relationship between ability and occupa- 
tion choice. 
In this section we attempt to interpret the observed patterns in the 
NLS data in terms of a simple econometric model with two parts. One 
submodel explains occupation choice as a function of the earnings and 
nonmonetary characteristics associated with alternative occupations. 
The other explains occupation-specific earnings as a function of aca- 
demic ability and other factors. With this done, it is possible in principle 
to predict the effect of changes in teacher salaries on the probability 
that a college graduate of given academic ability selects teaching as his 
or her occupation. 
11.4.1  A Model of  Occupation Choice and Earnings 
Let i = 1 designate the occupation of teacher and let i  = 0 represent 
all other occupations. Let T be the population of working college grad- 
uates and assume that each person t in T must select between the two 
classes of occupations. Assume that person t associates with teaching 
an expected present discounted earnings per week y(t1) and an index 
of nonmonetary job characteristics g + y(r). Here g is a constant and 
y vanes with t.  Person  aggregates the monetary and nonmonetary 
characteristics into a utility value 
(1) 
Nonmonetary job characteristics are unobservable to us, so we treat 
y(t) as a random variable distributed over T. Given the presence of the 
intercept g, we set E[y(t)]  = 0 without loss of generality. 
u(t1) = y(t1)  + g + y(t). 
The utility of the nonteaching occupation is 
(2)  u(t0) = y(t0). 
Here, we have set the index of nonmonetary characteristics equal to 
zero in order to fix  the origin of the utility function. Thus, the term 
g + y(t) appearing in equation (1)  should be interpreted as indexing 
the nonmonetary characteristics of teaching relative to other occupa- 
tions. Note that in equations (1) and (2), u is measured in the same 
units as y. This fixes the scale af the utility function as dollars. 
We  assume that person t selects teaching as an occupation if 
(3) 
Some obvious objections may be raised against equation (3). This spec- 
ification of decision making ignores a host of dynamic considerations 
u(t1) - u(t0) = Ly(t1) -  y(t0)l + g  + y(t) > 0. 302  Charles F.  Manski 
in the determination  of  career paths.  Moreover, it aggregates broad 
arrays of heterogenous occupations into two fictitious, composite al- 
ternatives. Nevertheless, in the interest of enabling empirical analysis, 
we shall maintain equation (3) as a working hypothesis. 
Empirically, we take the chosen occupation of an NLS respondent 
to be his or her reported occupation in October 1979. We  do not directly 
observe expected earnings, but an indicator  is sometimes available. 
That is, we observe reported weekly pay in October 1979 for the chosen 
occupation. Assume that the relationship between expected earnings 
y and reported pay, designated  I: is 
(4) 
(5) 
where dl and do are constants and 8(tl)  and S(t0) are random variables 
over  T.  Given  the  presence  of  the  intercepts  d, and  do, we  set 
E[8(tl)]  = E[8(t0)] = 0. 
Observe that dl and do allow for the possibility that earnings vary 
systematically over the life cycle. In particular, if  salaries tend to rise 
with seniority, then we should expect dl and do to be negative since 
the NLS respondents are at the beginnings of their careers. The con- 
stants also allow for a population-wide difference between current and 
permanent income. In particular, we should expect do and possibly dl 
to be lower in a recession year than in a boom year. With dl and do 
picking up  cohort-wide  differences between reported  and  expected 
earnings, the random variables 8(tl) and S(t0) represent person-specific 
deviations. 
Let S(t)  and R(t)  be person 1’s observed SAT score and high school 
class rank. Assume that expected earnings in teaching is a linear func- 
tion of these measures of academic ability and of other variables ~(tl), 
that is, 
(6)  y(t1) = a1  + b,*S(t) + C]*R(t)  + E(tl), 
where (al,  bl,cl)  are constants. Similarly, assume that expected earning 
in the nonteaching occupation is given by 
(7)  y(t0) = a0  + bo*S(t) + c,*R(t) + E(t0). 
The coefficients (bl, cl)  and (bo,  co)  quantify the monetary returns 
to academic ability in the teaching and nonteaching occupations. The 
variables e(tl) and €(to)  represent worker-specific characteristics other 
than SAT score and class rank that are known to both employers and 
workers and are perceived as related to job performance.  We  do not 
observe these characteristics and so treat E(t1)  and ~(t0)  as random 
Y(t1)  =d]  + y(t1) + 8(tl), 
Y(t0)  = do  + y(t0)  + 8(tO), 303  Teacher Ability and Earnings 
variables over T. Given the presence of the intercepts al and ao, we 
set E[~(tl)]  = E[~(to)l  = 0. 
It follows from equations (4)  through  (7) that the reported pay of 
NLS respondent t is related to respondent’s SAT score and high school 
class rank by 
(8)  Y(t1)  = (d, + a])  + b,*S(t) + c,*R(t) + [Wl) + ~(tl)], 
if  the respondent is a teacher, and by 
(9) 
otherwise.  It follows from  equations  (3), (6), and  (7) that  an NLS 
respondent chooses to be a teacher if  and only if 
(10)  (g + a, - ao) + (bl -  bo)*S(t) + (c1 - c,)*R(t) 
Conditional on S and R, the probability that a person is observed to 
choose teaching is 
(1 1)  Pr(i = llS,R) = Pr(q < A  + B*S  + C*RZS,R), 
where A = (g + u1 - ao),  B=  (b, - bo),  C = (c, - co),  and q(r) = 
-[y(t) + E(t1) - €(to)]. 
Consider now  a policy proposal  whose  sole effect is to change a 
person’s expected earnings in teaching from y(  1) to y(  1)  + A’, for some 
X.  Under this proposal, the probability  that the person  will choose 
teaching as an occupation is 
(12)  Pr(i = lIS,R,X) = Pr(q <A + B*S  + C*R + XZS,R,X). 
If  the parameters A,B, and  C and the distribution  of  q are known, 
equation (12) provides an operational means of forecasting the impact 
of a proposed change in teacher salary on the occupation choice de- 
cision of a college graduate of given academic ability. 
We  shall estimate the probabilistic choice model (12) under the main- 
tained hypothesis that conditional on (S  ,R), 
Y(to) = (do + ao) + b,*S(t) + c,*R(t) + [S(to) + €(to)] 
+ [y(t) + E(t1) -  E(r0)l  > 0. 
(13)  [Y  ,S( 1),W),4  1) ,E(0)1  -  NO,  v)  1 
where  V is a fixed but unrestricted variance-covariance  matrix. The 
normality  assumption  aside, perhaps  the  most  restrictive  aspect  of 
equation (13) is the condition E(yIS,R) = 0. That is, on average, the 
nonmonetary returns to ability are the same in teaching and nonteaching. 
Leaving V unrestricted provides important flexibility. For one thing, 
it allows for the possibility of  compensating variations between the 
earnings and nonmonetary  characteristics of  a job. For example if, 
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working conditions and vice versa, then y and E( 1) should be negatively 
correlated, all else equal. 
The absence of restrictions on V also allows for any pattern of  cor- 
relation between ~(1)  and ~(0).  Consider the possibility that employers 
in the teaching and nonteaching occupations value the same worker 
attributes. Then among workers with given values of S  and R, a worker 
who expects relatively high earnings in teaching also should expect 
relatively high earnings in  nonteaching.  So ~(1)  and ~(0)  will be posi- 
tively correlated, all else equal. On the other hand, it may be that the 
qualities valued in teaching are not valued in nonteaching. Then, ~(1) 
and ~(0)  will be uncorrelated. Leaving V unrestricted allows for both 
possibilities. 
Under equation (13), the random variable q is normally distributed 
with mean zero and unrestricted standard deviation u,  conditional on 
(S,R).  Thus, the problem of estimating the probabilistic choice model 
(12) reduces to that of estimating the parameters A, B, C,  and u. For 
this to be possible, we must first establish that these parameters are 
identified. 
To  see that the parameters are identified, inspect the reduced form 
equations (8), (9), and (10). The identifiable parameters in equations 
(8) and (9) include  [(d, + al), blrcll,  [(do + a,,), bo,col,  and  certain 
functions of the matrix V. The identifiable parameters in equation (10) 
are [{(gl  + al -  ao)/u},  ((6, - bo)/u}, and {(c, - co)/u}].  It follows that 
of the parameters A, B, C, and u appearing in the forecasting model 
(12), Ah,  B, and C are always identified. u  is identified if either b1  # bo 
or c1 # co. 
The condition for identification of u  can be explained. If b, = bo  and 
c1 = co,  the monetary returns to academic ability are identical in the 
teaching and nonteaching occupations. Then the probability of choos- 
ing teaching is invariant with respect to academic ability. In this case, 
we cannot infer from the empirical pattern of ability and occupation 
choice the impact of  salary on occupation choice. 
11.4.2  Estimation of the Parameters 
In principle, equations (8), (9), and (10) can be estimated by the full 
information maximum likelihood method. (See Maddala 1983, 283 for 
details.) To  obtain the maximum likelihood estimate, a more or less 
standard iterative optimization algorithm was written. The routine uses 
the outer product of the score function to generate a search direction. 
It performs a linear search along this direction using an iterative quad- 
ratic inter(extra)polation method. The score function is calculated by 
applying two-sided numerical derivatives to the log-likelihood function. 
Unfortunately, the estimation of switching regressions with endog- 
enous selection is often more  difficult in  practice than in  principle. 305  Teacher Ability and Earnings 
Applying the optimization program from a number of alternative start- 
ing values, I have not been able to achieve convergent estimates. It 
turns out that the likelihood is very flat in some regions of the parameter 
space and has sharp ridges in others. As a consequence, the algorithm 
produces sequences of estimates that “hang up” in the flat regions and 
swing wildly across the parameter  space in the regions  with  sharp 
ridges. Apparently this behavior is not atypical. Several colleagues have 
reported that they have sometimes experienced similar difficulties in 
applying maximum likelihood to endogenous switching models. 
A simple alternative to maximum likelihood is the two-step approach 
of Heckman (1976); also see Maddala 1983,223). The first step ignores 
the presence of observations of reported earnings and estimates the 
identifiable parameters of equation (lo), namely Ah,  B/a,  and C/u, by 
maximum likelihood. We  have already reported these estimates in table 
11.3. 
The second step estimates the identifiable parameters of equation (8) 
from the subsample of teachers, by least squares regression of  Y(l) on 
an intercept, S,R, and an estimate of the “Mills ratio.” The identifiable 
parameters of  equation (9) are estimated  in  the  same manner.  The 
validity of the second step derives from the fact that conditional on 
S,R, and on being selected into the sample, the expected values of the 
disturbances 6(tl) + ~(tl)  and s(t0) +  are 
(14) 
(15) 
E[6(1)  + €(l)IS,R, q <A  + B*S  + C*R]  = -AI*M(l); 
E[6(0) + E(O)IS,R,  q > A  + B*S + C*R]  = Ao*M(O). 
Here Al  = E[{6(1) + ~(l)}*qI,  A.  = E[{6(0) + ~(O)}*ql,  and M(1) and 
M(0)  are the Mills ratios 
(16)  M(1) = +[(A  + B*S  + C*R)/a]/@[(A  + B*S  + C*R)/a]; 
(17)  M(0) = +[(A  +B*S  + C*R)/a]/ 
(1 - @[(A + B*S  + C*R)/a]). 
+ is the standard normal density and @ is the standard normal distri- 
bution function.  To  estimate M(1) and M(O), one uses the first step 
results. 
Note that the least squares estimates reported earlier in table 11.5 
differ from the second-step estimates in that they omit the Mills ratio 
variables. The table 11.5 estimates are inconsistent for the parameters 
of  equations (8) and 9 unless  XI  = A,,  = 0. Given that  q = -[y  + 
~(1)  - ~(0)],  the A coefficients are generally nonzero unless ~(1)  and 
~(0)  are identically zero. But this result holds only if expected earnings 
in teaching and nonteaching are determined solely by SAT score and 
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Execution of the second step of the two-step method always yields 
a numerical estimate. As with maximum likelihood, however, appli- 
cation can be less gratifying than the theory suggests. In particular, the 
fact that S  and R  are highly collinear with the Mills ratio variables 
suggests that if  the values of  A  are far from zero, large samples may 
be required to obtain useable second-step estimates. 
In fact, the second-step estimates obtained on our sex-disaggregated 
samples were not very credible and had large reported standard errors. 
Given this, it was natural to consider pooling the samples for males 
and females in an attempt to obtain more precise estimates. Pooling 
seemed justified because the slope coefficients of the occupation choice 
and earnings functions reported in tables 11.3 and 11.5 are very similar 
for males and females. This suggests that we can safely constrain the 
slope parameters of equations (8) and (9) to be equal for males and 
females. 
Estimates based on the pooled samples are given in table 11.6. The 
numbers listed in the “Reported Standard Error” columns do not cor- 
rect for heteroskedasticity nor for the fact that the Mills ratios have 
themselves been estimated. Nevertheless, they should at least indicate 
the orders of magnitude of the true standard errors. 
The results in table 11.6 are amazingly sensible, especially given the 
estimation difficulties described above. Our primary interest is in the 
estimates  of  the returns to academic ability, First observe that the 
partial return to high school class rank is almost identically positive in 
the teaching and nonteaching occupations, that is, c, = co > 0. This 
Table 11.6  Revised Linear Model of  Earnings as a Fundon of Sex, 
Occupation, and Academic Ability 
All Teachers  All Nonteachers 
Reported  Reported 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
SAT score  0.004  (0.060)  0.127  (0.031) 
Class rank  0.389  (0.207)  0.326  (0.145) 
(400- 1600) 
(1-100) 
Intercept  118.  (60.)  128.  (39.) 
Sex dummy  12.8  (35.5)  -92.3  (16.6) 
Mills ratio  42.2  (59.7)  140.0  (61.3) 
R2  .07  .11 
Sample size  253  1344 
Note: Earnings are in dollars per week, in 1979. 
(1 for females) 
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accords well with our estimates of equation (lo), reported in table 11.3, 
There we found that all else equal, the frequency of choice of teaching 
as an occupation does not vary with class rank, that is (c, - co)/u = 0. 
Second, observe that table 11.6 and table 11.3 are in agreement in 
their estimates of the returns to SAT score. In table 11.3 we saw that 
all else equal, the frequency of choice of teaching as an occupation 
falls as SAT score rises, that is (b, - bo)/o < 0. In table 11.6 we find 
that there is no partial return to SAT score in teaching and a positive 
return in nonteaching, that is 0 = b, < bo. 
Recall that u is identified if either 6, # bo or c1 # co. Based on the 
estimates in tables  11.3 and 11.6, it seems well founded to conclude 
that the former condition holds and the latter does not. A consistent 
estimate for u  can be formed by evaluating the identity 
(18) 
at the estimates of bl and bo given in table 11.6 and the estimate of 
(b, - bo)/u  given in table 11.3. We  obtain the estimates 0.004 and 0.127 
from table 11.6 and -0.0011  from table 11.3. Therefore, our estimate 
for u is 111.8. 
Now let us consider some other aspects of table 11.6. We  find that 
in teaching, males and females have essentially the same intercepts in 
their earnings functions. In nonteaching, the intercept for females is 
$90 per week lower than for males. This corroborates the pattern of 
sex differentials observed in table 11.4. 
The estimates of the Mills ratio coefficients satisfy 0 < -Al  < Ao. 
This pattern is easily explainable. Observe that 
(19) 
and that 
u = (b, - b,)/[(b, - bo)/u] 
-A1  = E"1)  + 41))*{Y + 41) -  40))1 
(20)  Ao  = E[{W)  + E(O))*{E(O) -  41) - Y)I, 
and consider  the case in  which the random variables are mutually 
independent. Then equations (19) and (20) reduce to -  XI = Var(E( l)] > 
0 and  A.  = Var[e(O)] > 0.  Moreover, we know from table  11.4 that 
conditioning on academic ability, the variance of reported earnings in 
nonteaching  is  larger  than  in  teaching.  This  suggests  that 
Var[~(l)]  < Var[e(O)]. Thus, there is an inherent predisposition toward 
the pattern 0 < -Al  < ho. To alter this pattern, the random variables 
must be mutually dependent in a sufficiently  strong and perverse manner. 
We  earlier pointed  out that if  -Al  and ho are nonzero, the least 
squares estimates of table 11.5 are biased. We can with some confidence 
predict the nature of the bias. Given that C = cl - co = 0, the Mills 
ratios M(1) and M(0) defined in equations (16) and (17) do not vary 
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bias, if any, in the estimates of c1  and co given in table 11.5. Given that 
B = bl - bo < 0, M(1) is an increasing function of  S  and M(0) is a 
decreasing one. Since -  XI and Xo are positive, we should expect that 
the estimate of bl in table 11.5 is biased upward and that of bo is biased 
downward. 
Comparison of tables 11.5 and 11.6 supports all of these predictions. 
The estimated returns to class rank are in the neighborhood of 0.35 in 
both tables. On the other hand, the estimated returns to SAT score 
differ substantially between the two tables. The estimates of b1 drop 
from -0.045  in table  11.5 to 0.004 in table 11.6. The estimates of bo 
rise from -0.064  in table 11.5 to 0.127 in table 11.6. 
11.5  The Impact of Earnings and Ability Standards on the Teaching 
Force 
In this section we apply the estimated model of  occupation choice 
and earnings to forecast  the consequences  of  some plausible policy 
proposals. Many parties have suggested that the size and quality of the 
teaching force can be  influenced by  combining increases  in  teacher 
salaries with the institution  of  minimum academic ability standards. 
We  shall evaluate policies  that  combine an across-the-board  salary 
increase  of  X  dollars per  week  with  a  minimum  SAT score M  for 
certification as a teacher. In practice, the SAT itself would probably 
not be used as criterion for teacher certification. Our forecasts are of 
interest if  a certification test similar to the SAT is invoked. 
Let D(S,M) =  1 if S > M; D(S,M) = 0 otherwise. As earlier, let @ 
be the standard normal distribution function. Under equations (12) and 
(13),  the probability  that  a member  of  the NLS72 cohort with SAT 
score S  and class rank R is eligible to teach and chooses teaching as 
his or her occupation is 
(21)  $(S,R,X,M)  = @[(A + B*S  + C*R + X)/a]*D(S,M). 
To obtain an operational version of equation (21), we use the esti- 
mates reported in tables  11.3 and  11.6 and accept the evidence that 
C = 0. Let F = 1 if the respondent is female and F  = 0 if male. Then 
+ 0.0089*X)*D(S,M) 
predicts the probability that a working NLS72 college graduate with 
SAT score S and sex F would have become a teacher under the policy 
characterized by (X,M). 
Given equation (22), we can easily predict the aggregate behavior of 
the NLS72 cohort. Let n = 1, . . . ,N designate the NLS72 respon- 
dents. Then 
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estimates the fraction of the cohort that would have become teachers 
under policy (X,M).  The average SAT score of those who would have 
become teachers can be estimated by 
To the extent that the cohort of working NLS72 college graduates are 
representative of the population from which teachers are drawn, com- 
putations of $(X,M)  and LR(X,M) provide forecasts of  the nationwide 
effect  of  policies  combining salary  increases  with  academic  ability 
standards. 
Table 11.7 reports forecasts for thirty values of the (X,M)  pair. The 
following major results emerge: 
-In  the absence of a minimum ability standard, increases in teacher 
earnings yield substantial growth in the size of the teaching force. This 
result is seen by inspection of the top row of table 11.7. SettingX = $25 
Table 11.7  Forecast Supply and Abdity of Teachers as a Function of  Earnings 
and Standards 
Minimum SAT Score 
and Fraction of 
Cohort above 
Minimum  +O  +  25  +  50  i  75  + 100 
Change in Earnings per Week (1979 dollars) 
400  1.00 
Supply of teachersa 
Average SAT score 
600  0.98 
.19 
950 
0.24  0.30 







0.23  0.29 





700  0.94 
0.17 
989 
0.22  0.27 





800  0.88 
0.15 
1017 
0.19  0.25 





900  0.73 
0.12 
1064 
0.15  0.19 





lo00  0.54 
0.08 
1126 
0.10  0.13 





*Fraction of the cohort of working NLS72 college graduates who have SAT scores above 
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is predicted to raise the supply of teachers from 19 percent of the cohort 
to 24  percent.  Setting X = $100 is predicted to raise the supply of 
teachers to 44 percent of the cohort. 
Recall from table 11.4 that the mean reported earnings in 1979 of the 
NLS72 teachers was about $225 per week. Allowing for the fact that 
reported earnings may be somewhat lower than expected earnings, $25 
is about a 10 percent increase in expected earnings and $100 is about 
a 40 percent increase. This implies that the aggregate wage elasticity 
of the supply of teachers ranges from about 2.4 for small increases in 
salary to about 3.2 for large changes. 
-In  the absence of a minimum ability standard, increases in teacher 
earnings yield only a minimal improvement in the average ability of 
the teaching force. The top row of table 11.7 predicts that as expected 
earnings increase, the average SAT score of those who choose to teach 
rises only very slightly, from 950 to 972. This result is easily explained. 
Increases in expected earnings attract more high-ability students into 
teaching, but the increases also attract more low-ability students. Over- 
all, the relative growth in low- and high-ability recruits turns out to be 
comparable to the initial composition of the teaching force. 
-If  teacher  salaries are not  increased, institution of  a minimum 
ability standard improves the average ability of the teaching force but 
reduces its size. The first column of table 11.7 predicts the magnitude 
of these effects. In particular, requirement of a minimum SAT score of 
800 for teacher certification is predicted to raise the average SAT score 
of the teaching force from 950 to 1,017 but to reduce the supply of 
teachers from  19  percent  to  15  percent  of  the NLS72 cohort. The 
average SAT score of all college graduates is not far from 1,017. Thus, 
setting 800 as the minimum score for certification succeeds in raising 
average teacher ability to the national average, at the cost of a 20 percent 
decline in the size of the teaching force. 
-The  average ability of the teaching force can be improved and the 
size of  the teaching force maintained if minimum ability standards are 
combined with  sufficient salary increases. The entries in  table  11.7 
reveal that if  800 is established as the minimum SAT score for certi- 
fication, salaries must be increased by $25 per week in order to maintain 
the size of the teaching force at 19 percent of the NLS72 cohort. Then 
the average SAT score of the teaching force is predicted to be 1,020. 
If the minimum SAT score is set at 1,000, prevention of  a reduction 
in the size of the teaching force is predicted to require a salary increase 
of around $90 per week. In this case, the average SAT score of  the 
teaching force is predicted to be about 1,130. Observe that setting the 
minimum  SAT score at 1,000 leaves only 54 percent of the NLS72 
cohort eligible to be teachers. Thus, for 19  percent of the cohort to 
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graduates must choose to enter teaching.  It should not be surprising 
that a substantial increase in salaries is needed to induce such a large 
shift from present patterns of behavior. 
11.6  Conclusion 
Evaluation of proposals to improve the quality of the teaching force 
requires credible forecasts of  the consequences  of these proposals. 
Credible forecasting requires an empirical understanding of the deter- 
minants of occupation choices. In this chapter, we have attempted to 
provide the needed empirical analysis and have offered forecasts de- 
rived from it. 
Our interpretation of the NLS72 data rests on a number of maintained 
assumptions. We have taken care to call attention to these assumptions. 
We  have also noted difficulties experienced in executing certain ap- 
proaches to parameter estimation. Clearly, our analysis should be ac- 
cepted with caution. At the same time, the analysis should prove useful. 
In the past, discussion of policies intended to induce more high-ability 
students to enter teaching has been conducted in a vacuum. Now, some 
quantitative forecasts have been laid on the table. 
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Comment  Herman B. Leonard 
It seems fitting that we should consider a chapter about what we do- 
that is, about teaching. We can collectively bemoan the well-established 
low correlation between academic ability and earnings among teachers, 
which Manski has ably demonstrated  once again.  Or we can try to 
think of counterexamples to his finding-again  a familiar theme-that 
people with greater academic ability have lower probabilities of choos- 
ing teaching as a profession. It is hard not to be reminded of the old 
adage that if  you can’t do, teach, and if  you can’t teach, consult. We 
can at least take some solace in the fact that this chapter goes relatively 
easy on consultants.  It is with our teaching hats on that we should 
examine this work, and it is good to see a roomful of professional 
teachers take this problem seriously. 
And that is exactly what this chapter does. It takes a real policy 
problem-it  is not an understatement  to call it  one of  the pressing 
questions on the current national agenda-and  takes seriously the task 
of  saying something concrete and intelligent and empirical about it. 
The chapter is commendable on a variety of grounds. It is technically 
sound and creative and instructive. It is engaging. It is organized neatly 
into empirical stages. But what I find most commendable is that one 
has the sense that the chapter considers its problems to be “for real.” 
This chapter is also a nice illustration of how difficult serious policy 
work can be. Nothing ever quite fits together when we look at a real 
issue.  The data are not quite what  we want.  The model we  can fit 
cannot represent an effect we think is important. We  cannot separately 
identify two forces we would like to distinguish. This work faces all 
of those problems. The test of a policy paper is whether, when push 
comes to shove, it bends the issue to fit the empirical technology or 
the technology to fit the issue. What distinguishes this chapter-and, 
more broadly, this conference volume-is  that the outcome was never 
in doubt. From start to finish, Manski has concentrated on finding out 
what he could say about the issue, rather than finding an issue he had 
something to say about. 
Herman B. Leonard is the George F. Baker, Jr., Professor of Public Sector Financial 
Management at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and a faculty 
research fellow at  the National Bureau of Economic Research. 313  Teacher Ability and Earnings 
If we stick to the task, this kind of work is difficult. Manski’s issue 
involves the simplest and most direct policy question, and its resolution 
should turn on the simplest of  empirical findings. How much more do 
we have to pay teachers in order to attract a teaching cadre with better 
teaching ability? This is what the world would like to know, and it 
sounds like it should be an emminently approachable empirical ques- 
tion. But of course it is not. We  have no reliable measures of teaching 
quality; we must settle instead for studying the relation between the 
academic prowess of prospective teachers (as measured by test scores 
such as the SAT, taken years before a teaching career would start) and 
the salaries we would  have to pay  to attract them. Even then, the 
relationship is difficult to discern in the best data we could reasonably 
expect to have available.  If  a question this seemingly simple is this 
hard, it is no wonder, perhaps, that as researchers we so often seek 
questions less related to what the world wants to know and more closely 
linked to what we can find out. 
Manski’s overall results have the surface plausibility that comes from 
consonance with what microeconomic choice theory would have pre- 
dicted. If  we raise salaries for teachers  without  changing the hiring 
standards, we  will  wind  up  with  more  teachers.  If  we raise  hiring 
standards without raising salaries, we will wind up with fewer. If we 
raise both together, we can get the same number but better teachers. 
The question is, how much do we have to pay to get how much better 
teachers? 
To  find  out, Manski  specifies the simplest model that adequately 
represents a plausible parsimonious set of relevant influences. His model 
represents choice between teaching and nonteaching as determined by 
the (possibly differing) relationships  between ability and earnings in 
the two professions and by an individual characteristic,  the relative 
desirability of teaching compared to the alternative.’ This model is fit 
using the sample of  nearly 3,000 college graduates in the NLS  1972 
high school cohort who were working in  1979. This group included 
about 500 teachers. These data provide a well-suited test bed for the 
model and Manski’s hypotheses about the effects of earnings on profes- 
sional choice and the effects of ability on earnings. In particular, the 
NLS provides about the best we can hope for in measures of academic 
ability, which, for reasons of  observability, we are forced to use in 
place of teaching ability. We  are required to make the imperfect but 
1. The one restrictive feature of the model is its requirement that this characteristic be 
uncorrelated with earning ability in teaching and nonteaching, conditional on academic 
ability. This is required to separately identify the impact of earnings on choice of profes- 
sion. It is not a strong restriction-nce  measured ability is taken into account, it is not 
obvious why relative earning ability as a teacher should be related to the individual’s 
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not  unreasonable assumption that teachers who were more capable 
students are more capable teachers as well. At a minimum, it is hard 
to imagine that higher academic ability results in worse teaching, other 
things equal. 
In technical terms, the results are mixed, though in policy terms they 
are reasonably clear. As is not uncommon in endogenous switching 
models of  this kind, the likelihood function is not particularly  well 
behaved; it is flat over large regions of the parameter  space and has 
sharp ridges in others-a  common econometrician’s nightmare. The 
maximum likelihood estimation approach thus fails, providing one area 
where the work  might  be  extended  later.  Additional refinements  in 
programming techniques are not likely to yield better results-the  like- 
lihood function simply appears to be ill behaved.  This tells us that, 
with these data and in the context of this model, we know much more 
about some combinations of  the parameters than we  do about any 
particular parameter. It might be worthwhile to examine what combi- 
nations the likelihood function is tighter on and whether they provide 
any interesting limits for the parameter values of interest. In a nonlinear 
model of this type, where the reduced form is being estimated and the 
parameters  of  interest  are nonlinear  combinations of  the  estimated 
values, this approach may well not yield any additional insight, but it 
may be worth a try. 
The maximum likelihood results are, not to put too fine a point on 
it, disappointing-there  simply are none. Manski had hoped to estimate 
the model in the approved way, but the cutting edge of this technology 
is often dull on problems of this sort. If this chapter were on econo- 
metric theory, we might regard this as a technical failure and move on 
to another problem. But this chapter takes the policy problem seriously; 
reading it as a failure of econometric technique would be a dramatic 
underestimate of its contribution both as a policy comment and as an 
example of how policy-relevant research can be conducted. 
As a substitute for maximum likelihood estimates, Manski presents 
results based on a two-step estimation process. In spite of the diffi- 
culties encountered in the maximum likelihood estimation process, the 
two-stage procedure yields what Manski refers to as “sensible” results. 
The pattern  of  coefficients is as expected, and the magnitudes  are 
plausible. The returns to ability are found to be smaller for teachers 
than for others, as are the returns to class rank. This result is consistent 
with the overall findings that those with higher academic ability dif- 
ferentially choose not to be teachers. 
Manski’s description of the results as “sensible”  illustrates an im- 
portant feature of how we learn from the outputs of sophisticated model 
specifications. We  would reject out of hand  any results that did not 
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that the estimation method had not worked. This means that there is 
a decidedly limited extent to which we are willing to have our beliefs 
modified by observing results from sophisticated models such as these. 
This is as it should be because it is hard to tell how robust these results 
are. But the two-stage estimates do look rather sensible, and we can 
learn something from them as a result. 
The results suggest that there is a high supply elasticity of teachers, 
on the order of 2 or 3. Manski finds through his simulations based on 
the two-stage estimates that a 10 percent increase in pay, from $225 to 
$250, raises the fraction of the cohort predicted to choose teaching as 
a profession from about one-fifth to about one-fourth. This suggests 
that for not very much additional money, the degree of selectiveness 
that can be applied in choosing teachers can be increased fairly sub- 
stantially; Manski illustrates this by examining how much the minimum 
standard for SAT scores for teachers could be raised. These results are 
based  on a model that was difficult to estimate, and they  must be 
regarded as tentative. They do, however, suggest a higher sensitivity 
of job selection to earnings than we might have anticipated. 
But to focus on these results only is to miss the force of the essential 
contribution of  Manski’s paper as a discussion of a real policy issue 
and as an example of how policy research can add to the debate. His 
analysis covers the spectrum from the most basic to the most sophis- 
ticated. No one piece of evidence, by itself, would be convincing. But 
the combined force is substantial. And much of it comes from the power 
of the most basic observations. Based on the simplest descriptive tab- 
ulations, Manski observes:  1. teachers are the less able members of 
the cohort. 2. Twenty percent of teachers have combined SAT scores 
below  800.  The first is lamentable on general  principle; the second 
drives home its significance. Those who are deeply immersed in the 
education literature are at least vaguely aware of facts such as these. 
But stated to a broader audience-and  related, as in Manski’s paper, 
to the other findings-they  form a part of a startling pattern. Manski 
goes on to observe, now using more sophisticated modeling strategies 
(that confirm results obtainable through less sophisticated but not quite 
correct statistical approaches): 3. In teaching, there is little or no payoff 
for having higher ability, but there is in other professions. Not only, 
then, are salaries lower overall for teachers-which  could be explained 
away, for example, by the assertion that teachers have better working 
conditions-but  salaries are lower by a greater margin for the highly 
able than for the less able. This is a salient plausible justification for 
the first two findings. But the  sophisticated results can give us one 
more observation that rounds out the story: 4.  The selection of teaching 
as a profession is sensitive to wages offered to teachers. This last result 
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it is based on the more complex structure of underlying assumptions 
and is subject to potentially substantial errors in estimation. It is highly 
suggestive, however, and if  it is right its implications are of  dramatic 
importance. 
Some might see this chapter as being merely an elaborate econo- 
metric exercise designed to provide  an answer about the fourth ob- 
servation-and,  of course, much of the effort in the paper is dedicated 
to studying that issue. But to be a serious policy paper, it has also to 
show why the issue is material-and  that is exactly what the first three 
observations establish. Observations (1) and (2) tell us there is a prob- 
lem. Observation (3) says that we have not explored an obvious po- 
tential solution. Observation (4) then provides the hopeful message that 
there may really be a solution. It is the combination of these findings 
that could alter the quality and form of the policy debate on this question. 
Of  course, education policy is likely to be adjusted incrementally. 
We  may  decide to raise teacher  salaries  and to raise  the  selection 
standards applied in choosing from among those who apply. We  do not 
need to know exactly what the wage elasticity of supply of  teachers 
is, because we can-and  will-adjust  salaries gradually to get roughly 
the number we need. Does this mean that there is no value in trying 
to find out what the elasticity is? It does not, for two reasons. First, a 
crucial part of the policy debate is deciding how much more academic 
quality among teachers we want to buy. We  have to decide what ad- 
justments to make in the selection standards for those who aspire to 
teach. Having some sense for how the trade-off between desired aca- 
demic standards and teacher salaries might work can help us avoid 
excessively expensive programs, on the one hand, and ineffective pro- 
grams, on the other. Second, a finding that  the supply elasticity of 
teachers is high is fundamentally optimistic. It suggests that quality 
can be improved without enormous additional expenditures. That find- 
ing in itself may change the character of the discussion. 
Manski’s chapter makes contributions on two levels. It provides an 
illuminating tour of the data on the relation between earnings and ability 
in teaching, and capably presents an accessible set of important results 
about an issue of demonstrable practical importance. It is also an ex- 
ample of a serious policy paper. It presents results drawn from tech- 
niques ranging from the most simple and direct interpretations of the 
data to the most sophisticated methods available. It shows the kind of 
contribution that providing results integrated across a wide spectrum 
of  sophistication can make. 